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Abstract When producing anonymised microdata for research, national statistics institutes 
(NSIs) identify a number of 'risk scenarios' of how intruders might seek to attack a 
confidential dataset. This paper argues that the strategy used to identify confidentiality 
protection measures can be seriously misguided, mainly since scenarios focus on data 
protection without sufficient reference to other aspects of data. This paper brings together a 
number of findings to see how the above problem can be addressed in a practical context. 
Using as an example the creation of a scientific use file, the paper demonstrates that an 
alternative perspective can have dramatically different outcomes. 
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1. Introduction 
 
One of the key functions of national statistics institutes (NSIs) is to produce research datasets 
from the same sources used for aggregate statistics. Allowing access to this microdata 
effectively leverages the NSI’s investment in data collection. As data collected by NSIs are 
typically confidential, the dataset is rarely released ‘as is’ but has confidentiality protection 
measures applied to it. 
All NSIs carry out this same function to a greater or lesser degree and have sponsored 
much research into the production of ‘safe’ datasets. Hence there is a large academic 
literature to support such processes, as well as automatic tools such as µ-Argus
1
 and 
SDCMicro
2
. 
However, there is also a strong perspective about the way that the tools should be 
used. As several authors have noted, NSIs tend to be risk-averse, more comfortable with the 
‘policing’ than the ‘sharing’ approach to data access and focused on the statistical product 
rather than the use to which it is put. This leads to best practice models that emphasise the 
protection of data even in the most extreme circumstances. 
This paper argues that the strategy used by NSIs to identify confidentiality protection 
measures is seriously misguided. It leads to an excessively conservative approach which is 
not supported by evidence or required by law, and which can frustrate users. The 
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consideration of extremes over-protects the data, and the focus on data protection per se 
ignores the opportunities for protection via other methods.  
In recent years there has been a small but growing literature challenging the 
predominant view of risk assessment, both on theoretical grounds and by empirical evidence 
from forty years of dataset protection. The oft-cited argument that exceptional protection is 
enshrined in law seems dubious; most countries only require ‘reasonable’ protection. The 
implicit ethical stance of most literature (‘only release if safe’) has no more inherent validity 
than the alternative (‘release unless unsafe’), and yet this has a demonstrable impact on 
decisions taken. Perhaps most importantly, there is a wealth of information about how 
researchers use such data files and this is rarely considered. 
Changing the perspective can have significant consequences for the users and owners 
of the anonymised dataset. An evidence-based and user-centred approach to anonymisation 
takes into account factors other than inherent risk in the data. This can make substantial 
improvements to the utility of the dataset while preserving the low-risk nature of the data.  
We bring together a number of findings to see how the above problems can be 
addressed in a practical context. Using as an example the recent creation by the authors of a 
‘scientific use file’ (SUF) from multinational business survey data, the paper demonstrates 
that an alternative perspective can have dramatically different outcomes: in this case, from 
100% perturbation of all continuous variables to perturbation of under 1% of the observations 
for just one variable. 
The next section summarises the traditional approach. Section 3 then provides a 
critique and proposes an alternative strategy. Section 4 describes how this alternative model 
was used in the recent creation of an SUF from confidential business microdata, and the 
impact this had. Section 5 discusses the lessons learned and considers the implications of this 
more empirical approach on the growth in administrative data sources. 
 
2. Common approaches to anonymisation 
 
The ESSNet Handbook on Statistical Disclosure Control (SDC: Hundepool et al, 2010) 
provides a comprehensive overview on the discursive microdata anonymisation process. This 
Handbook, sponsored by Eurostat, contains a wealth of guidance on methods and tools, plus 
references for further information. While the Handbook has no statutory authority, it does 
provide a wide-ranging summary of received opinion at the time of writing, and is therefore 
used to reference this section.   
The Handbook notes that microdata protection should be based upon knowledge of 
the use of the data, the access requirements, the potential for an intruder to match external 
datasets, and the structure of the data itself. Risk scenarios are based upon both spontaneous 
recognition and actively searching for an individual, possibly using record linkage; for 
detailed empirical studies see Lenz (2006). For both of these, it is possible to generate 
estimates of the likelihood of re-identification of an individual. These probabilities can then 
be used to compare alternative data protection methods.  
Whilst changes in the probability of detection can be described in a straight-forward 
manner, changes in the utility of the data are harder to quantify, as this depends upon the 
likely uses of the data. Sophisticated analyses on the effect of anonymisation to the analytical 
validity of microdata can be found in Ronning et al. (2005).  
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3. Critique of common perspective 
 
There are three major concerns about the way microdata protection is implemented in 
practice. Two can be seen as failures to use evidence; the third is a case of failure of the 
theoretical framework for decision-making. 
 
a. Focus on data protection 
 
Microdata sets are described as ‘public use files’ (PUFs, available without restriction), 
‘scientific use files’ (SUFs, available to a restricted set of researchers), or ‘controlled access 
files’ (CAFs, available only within an environment controlled by the NSI), but it is 
questionable how much attention is paid to these different surrounding conditions. 
In particular, there is always the assumption that these files are subject to an intruder 
threat. For CAFs and SUFs this is a difficult case to make. Good practice requires the 
removal of direct identifiers (names etc.) from such files, so identification is only possible 
indirectly, implying some effort on the part of the researcher. For CAFs this effort is 
monitored. For SUFs, the effort is not monitored but effort is still required (see Lenz, 2006); 
in both cases it could be argued that, if intruder threat is a genuine risk, the problem lies with 
accreditation procedures and not with anonymisation.  
Such evidence as there is suggests that intruder modelling is unrealistic. There are no 
cases (to the authors’ knowledge) of malicious misuse of CAFs or SUFs in the ways 
identified by standard risk scenarios. There is ample evidence of SUF/CAF researchers 
making mistakes, or CAF researchers deliberately circumventing procedures to make life 
easier for themselves – but not to deliberately de-anonymise the data. Moreover, even such 
non-malicious outcomes are rare. One author’s ten years of managing CAF usage saw three 
deliberate acts of misuse and another ten or so genuine mistakes, set in the context of some 
ten thousand user visits. Within this, the deliberate misuses were all the result of researchers 
trying to reorganise processes for their own convenience, not to re-identify data. The authors’ 
experience with managers of SUF and CAF releases across the world suggests that this 
outcome is expected
3
. 
In summary, for SUFs and CAFs empirical evidence suggests that factors other than 
protection of the data dominate the likelihood of successful protection; such non-data control 
measures have a forty year record of demonstrable effectiveness.  
For PUFs, it could be argued that intruder threat is a genuine risk, as potentially it 
only needs one person in the world to have sufficient malice or prurience to try to breach 
confidentiality protection. However, this assumes that the data are sufficiently interesting to 
make the effort worthwhile. For example, if John Smith works at a local bakery, this could be 
determined from his Labour Force Survey responses; but it may be easier to find it out by 
using the internet, social networks or watching him walk to work. Yes, the Labour Force 
Survey data is confidential and should be protected – but is it of sufficient value to make an 
attack worthwhile
4
? 
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true but not practically helpful. 
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b. Worst-case scenarios and spurious objectivity 
 
As noted above, it may be easier to get agreement on worst-case scenarios, as they seem 
easier to define. This makes sense in the context of academic research articles, where the aim 
is to compare methods using a common base wherever possible. Such assumptions can then 
allow relative effectiveness of methods to be assessed, which is important in developing 
understanding of the impact of different techniques. 
It does not however follow that worst-case scenarios should be used in planning in 
practice.  First, there is no evidence to suggest that typical worst-case scenarios ever manifest 
themselves.  It is well known that there are large differences between data from official 
statistics and external commercial databases (eg. Lenz, 2006; Hafner, 2008). This implies a 
kind of extra protection for the data that adds to the protection achieved by anonymisation 
procedures. However the NSI often conduct a worst case scenario as they match the 
anonymized data to the original survey data. One reason for this practice is that it can be very 
time consuming and expensive to generate a realistic external data source for every survey 
since the commercial data have to be purchased from database providers and the identifiers 
often have to be harmonized manually. But the result of a non-realistic worst case scenario 
may not be treated the same way as the result of a realistic scenario. This is the fault in the 
line of argument the NSI commits, and so they prevent the release of more and better 
microdata for the scientific community. In addition a researcher who is sufficiently 
incentivised to undertake the risk and effort of matching is likely to have a number of 
different possibilities available (including the more simple one of talking to unsuspecting NSI 
staff). 
Second, these assumptions are defended on the grounds that all practical measures 
need to be taken to protect the data. This is unlikely to be true. All statistical legislation 
leaves the level of protection as something to be determined in specific context; increasingly, 
laws explicitly state that only ‘reasonable’ protection need be provided (for example, 
Eurostat
5
 or the German construct of De Facto Anonymity
6
 ). The law in effect is recognising 
that worst-case scenario planning is unlikely to be good for society: designing strategy based 
on extreme hypothetical outcomes imposes costs on society which a more reasonable view of 
the likelihood of events would avoid. 
Finally, even the objectivity of worst-case planning is suspect. Skinner (2012) argues 
that protestations of ‘objectivity’ in risk assessment are misleading; the framing of the risk 
assessment is decided by the NSI on subjective criteria. For example, the ESSNet Handbook 
describes a potential ‘conservative and worst case scenario’ with only one known external 
data source being used for matching and with design, but not response, weights available. 
Clearly, both assumptions are debatable, and an NSI adopting these assumptions is making a 
subjective decision. 
Once it is recognised that worst-case scenarios are (a) inefficient (b) not supported by 
evidence (c) not required by legislation and (d) as subjective as any other, their use in 
decision-making comes into question. 
 
c. The default position 
 
The default perspective of most NSIs is defensive: no data can be released unless it can be 
shown to be ‘safe’. However, the NSI could take the co-operative perspective that all data 
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will be released unless it presents a disclosure risk
7
. Ritchie (2014a) demonstrates how these 
two perspectives will generate different outcomes, with the former almost certain to restrict 
data access much more. Typically this arises because NSIs have insufficient user input to 
influence the discussion and overcome security concerns (the ‘diffuse benefit and 
concentrated cost’ often associated with lack of government action; Moore, 2010; Ritchie, 
2014b). 
This defensive perspective is reflected in the lack of discussion in meetings and the 
literature. At the 2013 UNECE meeting on statistical confidentiality, two sessions on data 
access were organised. With the honourable exception of the Italian NSI ISTAT, no papers 
analysed user needs; all other papers explained how they were ‘opening up’ data access (that 
is, the default is ‘no release’) and this should be seen as a bonus for users.  
 
d. Summary 
 
The standard approach to anonymisation suffers from three failings: a focus on data 
protection as the prime guarantee of confidentiality; worst-case planning; and an approach to 
confidentiality driven by the need to avoid failure rather than maximise public benefit. 
Underlying each of these problems is an approach to risk that suggest is focuses on theory 
rather than evidence and data rather than environment. Hence we describe the ‘typical’ 
approach as theory-based and data-centric. 
In contrast, we propose a model which is user-centred and evidence based. The 
following section describes the implementation of such an approach. 
 
4. Example of an evidence-based risk assessment: the 2010 CIS8 
 
The Community Innovation Survey (CIS) is a business survey carried out in all EU countries. 
Eurostat distributes a subset of country files, anonymised as ‘scientific use files’ for research 
purposes. However, uses have been very small and the perception exists that the existing 
anonymisation method has created, at best, a teaching dataset. 
In 2013 Eurostat commissioned a review of the protection strategy to create the 2010 
CIS SUFs with recommendations for changes, if any. Whilst the review recommended a 
number of significant changes, we focus on the risk scenario and the consequences for 
protection mechanisms. 
 
e. Identify user needs 
 
The study analysed 11 research papers using the CIS in SUF- and CAF-form in different 
countries (official documents from NSIs or other government departments were also analysed 
but these consisted exclusively of simple tabulations). In addition, the authors could draw on 
nine years’ observations of researchers using earlier versions of the CIS in a controlled 
environment. Finally, a Google Scholar search was carried out. These confirmed that the 
overwhelming use of the CIS by researchers (as opposed to government agencies who hold 
the source data) was marginal analysis, particularly linear and non-linear regression. 
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f. Identify the user environment and risks 
 
There is no evidence of malicious use of SUFs by genuine researchers. There is evidence of 
accidental and deliberate misuse which has the consequence of breaching confidentiality 
rules or procedures (Desai and Ritchie, 2009). 
For business data, the most significant risk is spontaneous recognition of outliers. The 
researcher may publicly speculate on the identity of the firm. Alternatively the researcher 
may try to augment or compare the SUF with data from external sources. Note that it is not a 
risk that a researcher spontaneously notes the characteristics of an observation and muses on 
the company identity but does not follow up - there has been no disclosure to an unauthorised 
person, and no deliberate attempt to identify a company. 
In general, outputs from genuine research are low risk, but there are a large number of 
categorical variables in the CIS and the interest in them makes the potential for disclosure by 
differencing larger. There is also the risk of group disclosure. The categorical variables in the 
CIS make saturated or empty cells more likely: for example, there may be many cells in a 
table where all companies undertake a specific form of innovation. However, as identified 
above, the main research interest in CIS use is in marginal analyses, where the disclosure 
potential is negligible. 
There is always the risk from a misperceived output; for example, a naïve reader of a 
paper could assume that a statistic refers to a single company even if it does not. In this case, 
the risk is not to confidentiality but to the reputation of the organisations collecting and 
distributing the data.  
 
g. Evaluate risks 
 
Re-identification risk arises from publicly available classification data (company size, head 
office location etc) and from extreme values in continuous attributes, such as very high 
turnover. However, practical experiments done by the authors and others in this field (for 
example, Hafner, 2008; Bauer, et al. 2009) suggest that exact matching on continuous 
variables is not a practical concern, although a broad search on industrial classification and 
location might be more effective. In addition, identification may also arise from matching to 
external databases, but the sampling frame is the Eurostat-compliant business register, which 
is designed to be a statistically accurate reflection of economic activity, not financially. As is 
well-known (eg. Evans and Ritchie 2006), NSI business registers are difficult to reconcile 
with publicly available accounting information which makes extensive use of financial 
engineering. 
These two factors provide considerable uncertainty about which companies are 
included in the data, and in which organisational form. Finally, much of the data in the CIS, 
while useful for research, has a low disclosure value. For example, being able to identify that 
Company X has engaged in product innovation over the period 2008-2010 is, technically, a 
breach of information supplied in confidence; but it is of negligible commercial value, and so 
unlikely to be a target for hackers. 
In summary, spontaneous recognition is feasible but unlikely to have sufficient 
certainty to be worthwhile; a successful and informative match is theoretically possible but 
the practical problems are large. Most importantly, matching requires the researcher to 
actively search for the company; it is not an outcome of spontaneous recognition. The SUF 
licence agreement forbids attempting to identify any respondent; evidence suggests this is 
credible. Therefore, it appears that the risks of deliberate disclosure associated with 
researcher inquisitiveness are of a very low order. 
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h. Identify residual risks 
 
This led to three credible risk scenarios: 
I) A researcher publishes a magnitude table with one or two observations in a cell 
II) A researcher comments on the dominance of one unit in a cell 
III) A researcher comments on the dominance of one unit in the dataset 
 
These are all expected to arise as a result of error on the part of the researcher. 
 
5. Impact 
 
As noted above, the project recommended a wide range of changes to the anonymisation 
strategy, not all of which are relevant here. However, the way the risk scenarios were defined 
had important implications for the protection strategy. 
The previous anonymisation strategy stated that deliberate misuse was not deemed to 
be a risk. However, the logic of this position was not followed through: no other explicit risk 
was identified; nevertheless, all observations were deemed to be potentially problematic. The 
problems were to be addressed by microaggregation of all metric variables and global 
recoding. This was also argued to reduce the need to test for and address dominance 
problems. The conceptual framework used in that case was defensive: ‘apply protection until 
it is safe to release’. 
In contrast, the revised risk scenario implied a very different protection model. As the 
key risk was identified as accidental disclosure, only measures to tackle dominance and small 
cell count were put in place, apart from a global recode of employment. In effect, only 
observations at risk were perturbed; the conceptual framework was ‘apply protection only if 
it is demonstrably necessary; otherwise release’. Moreover, in deciding observations at risk, 
the team took account of the known disparity between published and surveyed employment 
data to provide additional arguments why the data was inherently safe. 
The impact of this was to reduce the microaggregation from 100% of records to less 
than 1% for all countries; some countries saw no change to their data at all. Some sample 
linear and non-linear regressions were run, demonstrating considerable smaller impacts on 
coefficients. However, the strategy was also able to tackle dominance problems omitted in 
previous years. The ‘do not disturb’ strategy of Ichim (2007) and Ichim and Franconi (2008) 
found similar results. 
 
6. Discussion and conclusion 
 
Theoretically, microdata protection is a well-established mature field with a great deal of 
advice for NSIs trying to make data available. However, in practice, there is a concern that 
data protection takes precedence over the user experience. This has been a complaint from 
users for years but in recent times the data protection community has begun to question the 
profoundly conservative outlook found in NSIs. 
The example discussed, of creating an SUF for the CIS, shows that a change in 
attitude can have significant consequences. No new methods were developed: protection was 
a combination of recoding and microaggregation. The difference came in the default 
perspective of the research team; the use of evidence in assessing disclosure risk; a realistic 
interpretation of what counted as ‘reasonable’ protection; and an explicit allowance for 
protection measures in the access environment. The end result was a dataset with more 
protection but much less impact on users. 
9 
 
Future trends in data are moving away from surveys to administrative data sources. 
These will present additional problems. For example, PUFs based on administrative data will 
be accessible to the office workers who have access to the original data. This implies that the 
problem of matching to external databases will become much more prevalent. Given the 
amount of perturbation needed to protect against matches in an identical data source, it may 
be worthwhile beginning to gather more evidence on the effectiveness of non-data-based 
protection mechanisms. 
 
 
References 
 
Bauer, T., Bachteler, T., Bender, S., Huber, M., Schnell, R., Dundler, A., and Engel, D. 
(2009) Why are firms treated in a different way than individuals? – Results of a re-
identification experiment with real data. Discussion paper. Ruhr-University Bochum 
Desai, T. and Ritchie, F. (2010) Effective researcher management. Work session on statistical 
data confidentiality, Bilbao 17-19 December 2009 
Evans, P. and Ritchie, F. (2009) UK Company Statistics Reconciliation Project: final report, 
Report for the Department of Business Enterprise and Regulatory Reform; URN 
09/599 
Franconi, L. and Ichim, D. (2008) Community Innovation Survey: comparable dissemination. 
In: Work session on statistical data confidentiality, Manchester 2-4 December 2007, 
Eurostat Methodologies and Working papers; pp11-23 
Hafner, H.-P. (2008) Die Qualität der Angriffsdatenbank für die Matchingexperimente mit 
den Daten des KSE-Panels 1999 – 2002. Mimeo. IAB 
Hafner, H.-P., Lenz, R., Ritchie, F. (2014): Report for Eurostat on the creation of CIS 
scientific use files. Eurostat, June. 
Hundepool, A., Domingo-Ferrer, J., Franconi, L., Giessing, S., Lenz, R., Longhurst, J., 
Schulte Nord-holt, E., Seri, G. and De Wolf, P. (1010) Handbook on Statistical 
Disclosure Control, ESSNet SDC http://neon.vb.cbs.nl/casc/.\SDC_Handbook.pdf  
Ichim, D. (2007) Microdata Anonymisation of the Community Innovation Survey Data: A 
Density Based Clustering Approach for Risk Assessment. Dokumenti Istat 2 
http://www3.istat.it/dati/pubbsci/documenti/Documenti/doc_2007/2007_2.pdf 
Lenz R. (2006) Measuring the disclosure protection of micro aggregated business microdata - 
an analysis taking as an example the German Structure of Costs Survey, Journal of 
Official Statistics 22 (4),  681-710 
Moore M.H. (2010) Break-Through Innovations and Continuous Improvement: Two 
Different Models of Innovative Processes in the Public Sector. Public Money and 
Management January v44  
Ritchie F. (2014a) Access to sensitive data: satisfying objectives rather than constraints, J. 
Official Stat., October 
Ritchie F. (2014b) Resistance to change in government: risk, inertia and incentives. Working 
papers in Economics no. 1412, University of the West of England, Bristol. December  
Ronning, G., Sturm, R., Hoehne, J., Lenz, R., Rosemann, M., Scheffler, M., and Vorgrimler, 
D. (205) Handbuch zur Anonymisierung wirtschaftsstatistischer Mikrodaten.  Statistik 
und Wissenschaft, Band 4, DeStatis 
Skinner, C. J. (2012) Statistical disclosure risk: seperating potential and harm. International 
Statistical Review 80 (3), 349-368 
 
 
  
10 
 
Recent UWE Economics Papers 
See http://www1.uwe.ac.uk/bl/research/bristoleconomics/research for a full list 
 
 
2015 
 
1503 User-focused threat identification for anonymised microdata 
Hans-Peter Hafner
1
, Felix Ritchie
2
 and Rainer Lenz
3
 
 
1502  Reflections on the one-minute paper 
Damian Whittard 
 
1501 Principles- versus rules-based output statistical disclosure control in remote access environments 
 Felix Ritchie and Mark Elliot 
 
 
2014 
 
1413 Addressing the human factor in data access: incentive compatibility, legitimacy and cost-
effectiveness in public data resources 
 Felix Ritchie and Richard Welpton 
 
1412 Resistance to change in government: risk, inertia and incentives 
 Felix Ritchie 
 
1411 Emigration, remittances and corruption experience of those staying behind 
 Artjoms Ivlevs and Roswitha M. King 
 
1410 Operationalising ‘safe statistics’: the case of linear regression 
 Felix Ritchie 
 
1409 Is temporary employment a cause or consequence of poor mental health? 
Chris Dawson, Michail Veliziotis, Gail Pacheco and Don J Webber 
 
1408  Regional productivity in a multi-speed Europe  
Don J. Webber, Min Hua Jen and Eoin O’Leary 
 
1407 Assimilation of the migrant work ethic 
Chris Dawson, Michail Veliziotis, Benjamin Hopkins 
 
1406 Empirical evidence on the use of the FLQ formula for regionalizing national input-output tables: the case of 
the Province of Córdoba, Argentina 
 Anthony T. Flegg, Leonardo J. Mastronardi and Carlos A. Romero 
 
1405 Can the one minute paper breathe life back into the economics lecture? 
Damian Whittard 
 
1404 The role of social norms in incentivising energy reduction in organisations 
 Peter Bradley, Matthew Leach and Shane Fudge 
 
1403 How do knowledge brokers work? The case of WERS 
 Hilary Drew, Felix Ritchie and Anna King 
 
1402 Happy moves? Assessing the impact of subjective well-being on the emigration decision 
Artjoms Ivlevs 
 
1401 Communist party membership and bribe paying in transitional economies 
Timothy Hinks and Artjoms Ivlevs 
 
 
11 
 
2013 
 
1315 Global economic crisis and corruption experience: Evidence from transition economies 
Artjoms Ivlevs and Timothy Hinks 
 
1314 A two-state Markov-switching distinctive conditional variance application for tanker freight returns 
Wessam Abouarghoub, Iris Biefang-Frisancho Mariscal and Peter Howells  
 
1313  Measuring the level of risk exposure in tanker shipping freight markets 
Wessam Abouarghoub and Iris Biefang-Frisancho Mariscal 
 
1312 Modelling the sectoral allocation of labour in open economy models 
Laura Povoledo 
 
1311 The US Fed and the Bank of England: ownership, structure and ‘independence’ 
Peter Howells 
 
1310 Cross-hauling and regional input-output tables: the case of the province of Hubei, China 
Anthony T. Flegg, Yongming Huang and Timo Tohmo 
 
1309 Temporary employment, job satisfaction and subjective well-being 
Chris Dawson and Michail Veliziotis 
 
1308 Risk taking and monetary policy before the crisis: the case of Germany 
Iris Biefang-Frisancho Mariscal 
 
1307 What determines students’ choices of elective modules? 
 Mary R Hedges, Gail A Pacheco and Don J Webber 
 
1306 How should economics curricula be evaluated? 
Andrew Mearman 
 
1305 Temporary employment and wellbeing: Selection or causal? 
Chris Dawson, Don J Webber and Ben Hopkins 
 
1304 Trade unions and unpaid overtime in Britain 
Michail Veliziotis 
 
1303 Why do students study economics? 
Andrew Mearman, Aspasia Papa and Don J. Webber 
 
1302  Estimating regional input coefficients and multipliers: The use of the FLQ is not a gamble 
Anthony T. Flegg and Timo Tohmo 
 
1301  Liquidity and credit risks in the UK’s financial crisis: How QE changed the relationship 
Woon Wong, Iris Biefang-Frisancho Mariscal, Wanru Yao and Peter Howells 
 
 
2012 
 
1221 The impact of the quality of the work environment on employees’ intention to quit 
Ray Markey, Katherine Ravenswood and Don J. Webber 
 
1220  The changing influence of culture on job satisfaction across Europe: 1981-2008 
Gail Pacheco, De Wet van der Westhuizen and Don J. Webber 
 
1219  Understanding student attendance in Business Schools: an exploratory study 
Andrew Mearman, Don J. Webber, Artjoms Ivļevs, Tanzila Rahman and Gail Pacheco 
